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Article 30 - NY Criminal Procedure Law

• NY Laws ›
• CPL ›
• Part 1 ›
• Title C ›
• Article 30

S 30.10 Timeliness of prosecutions; periods of limitation.
 1. A criminal action must be commenced within the period of limitation
  prescribed in the ensuing subdivisions of this section.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three:
    (a) A prosecution for a class A felony, or rape in the first degree as
  defined  in  section  130.35  of  the  penal  law, or a crime defined or
  formerly defined in section 130.50  of  the  penal  law,  or  aggravated
  sexual  abuse  in  the  first degree as defined in section 130.70 of the
  penal law, or course of sexual conduct against  a  child  in  the  first
  degree as defined in section 130.75 of the penal law may be commenced at
  any time;
    (b)  A  prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within five
  years after the commission thereof;
    (c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years
  after the commission thereof;
    (d) A prosecution for a petty offense must  be  commenced  within  one
  year after the commission thereof.
    3.  Notwithstanding  the provisions of subdivision two, the periods of
  limitation for the commencement of  criminal  actions  are  extended  as
  follows in the indicated circumstances:
    (a)  A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in violation of a
  fiduciary duty  may  be  commenced  within  one  year  after  the  facts
  constituting  such  offense  are  discovered  or,  in  the  exercise  of
  reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by the aggrieved party
  or by a person under a legal duty to represent him who  is  not  himself
  implicated in the commission of the offense.
    (b)  A  prosecution  for  any  offense  involving misconduct in public
  office by a public servant including,  without  limitation,  an  offense
  defined  in  article  four  hundred  ninety-six of the penal law, may be
  commenced against a public  servant,  or  any  other  person  acting  in
  concert  with  such  public  servant  at  any  time  during  such public
  servant's service  in  such  office  or  within  five  years  after  the
  termination  of  such  service; provided however, that in no event shall
  the period of limitation be extended by more than five years beyond  the
  period otherwise applicable under subdivision two of this section.
    (c) A prosecution for any crime set forth  in  title  twenty-seven  or
  article  seventy-one  of  the  environmental  conservation  law  may  be
  commenced within four years after the facts constituting such crime  are
  discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been
  discovered by a public servant who has the responsibility to enforce the
  provisions of said title and article.
    (d)  A  prosecution  for  any  misdemeanor set forth in the tax law or
  chapter forty-six of the administrative code of the  city  of  New  York
  must be commenced within three years after the commission thereof.
    (e)  A prosecution for course of sexual conduct against a child in the
  second degree as defined in section 130.80  of  the  penal  law  may  be
  commenced  within five years of the commission of the most recent act of
  sexual conduct.
    (f) For purposes of  a  prosecution  involving  a  sexual  offense  as
  defined  in  article  one  hundred thirty of the penal law, other than a
  sexual offense delineated in paragraph (a) of subdivision  two  of  this
  section,  committed  against  a  child  less than eighteen years of age,
  incest in the first, second or  third  degree  as  defined  in  sections
  255.27,  255.26  and  255.25  of the penal law committed against a child
  less than eighteen years  of  age,  or  use  of  a  child  in  a  sexual
  performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law, the period of
  limitation shall not begin to run until the child has reached the age of
  eighteen  or  the  offense  is  reported  to a law enforcement agency or
  statewide central register of child abuse  and  maltreatment,  whichever
  occurs earlier.
    (g)  A  prosecution  for  any  felony  defined in article four hundred
  ninety of the penal law must be commenced within eight years  after  the
  commission thereof provided, however, that in a prosecution for a felony
  defined  in  article  four  hundred  ninety  of  the  penal  law, if the
  commission  of such felony offense resulted in, or created a foreseeable
  risk of, death  or  serious  physical  injury  to  another  person,  the
  prosecution  may  be  commenced  at  any  time;  provided, however, that
  nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to shorten or otherwise lessen
  the period, defined in any other applicable law, in which a  prosecution
  for a felony designated in this paragraph may be commenced.
    4.  In calculating the time limitation applicable to commencement of a
  criminal action, the following periods shall not be included:
    (a) Any period following the commission of the  offense  during  which
  (i)  the  defendant  was  continuously  outside  this  state or (ii) the
  whereabouts of the defendant were continuously unknown and  continuously
  unascertainable  by the exercise of reasonable diligence. However, in no
  event shall the period of limitation be extended by more than five years
  beyond the period otherwise applicable under subdivision two.
    (b) When a prosecution for an offense is lawfully commenced within the
  prescribed  period  of  limitation  therefor,  and  when  an  accusatory
  instrument   upon  which  such  prosecution  is  based  is  subsequently
  dismissed by an  authorized  court  under  directions  or  circumstances
  permitting  the  lodging  of  another  charge for the same offense or an
  offense based on  the  same  conduct,  the  period  extending  from  the
  commencement  of  the  thus defeated prosecution to the dismissal of the
  accusatory instrument does not  constitute  a  part  of  the  period  of
  limitation applicable to commencement of prosecution by a new charge.

S 30.20 Speedy trial; in general.
  1.  After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled to
a speedy trial.
  2.  Insofar as is practicable, the trial of a criminal action must be
given preference over civil cases; and the trial of a criminal action
where the defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff
during the pendency of the criminal action must be given preference over
other criminal actions.

S 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1.  Except  as  otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
  pursuant to paragraph (e)  of  subdivision  one  of  section  170.30  or
  paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
  the people are not ready for trial within:
    (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
  felony;
    (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
  misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
  months and none of which is a felony;
    (c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal  action  wherein  the
  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
  three months and none of which is a crime punishable by  a  sentence  of
  imprisonment of more than three months;
    (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
  violation and none of which is a crime.
    2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
  committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he must  be
  released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may
  be  just  and  reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in that
  criminal action within:
    (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
    (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
  of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor  punishable
  by  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  of more than three months and none of
  which is a felony;
    (c) fifteen days from  the  commencement  of  his  commitment  to  the
  custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
  accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a  misdemeanor
  punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months
  and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
  more than three months;
    (d) five days from the commencement of his commitment to  the  custody
  of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and  none  of
  which is a crime.
    3.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
  wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
  125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
    (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
  of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
  trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
  specified   period   and  their  present  unreadiness  is  due  to  some
  exceptional fact or circumstance, including, but  not  limited  to,  the
  sudden  unavailability  of  evidence material to the people's case, when
  the district  attorney  has  exercised  due  diligence  to  obtain  such
  evidence  and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence
  will become available in a reasonable period.
    (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
    (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
  another offense;
    (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
  being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
  which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
    (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
  who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
  otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
  which he  has  been  released,  by  failing  to  appear  at  a  judicial
  proceeding at which his presence is required or otherwise.
    4.  In  computing  the  time within which the people must be ready for
  trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following  periods  must
  be excluded:
    (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
  concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
  the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
  incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
  particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
  period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
  or
    (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
  court at the request of, or with the consent of, the  defendant  or  his
  counsel. The court must grant such a continuance only if it is satisfied
  that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into account the
  public  interest  in  the  prompt  dispositions  of  criminal charges. A
  defendant without counsel must not be deemed  to  have  consented  to  a
  continuance  unless he has been advised by the court of his rights under
  these rules and the effect of his consent; or
    (c)  (i)  the  period  of  delay  resulting  from   the   absence   or
  unavailability  of  the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent
  whenever  his  location  is  unknown  and  he  is  attempting  to  avoid
  apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due
  diligence.  A  defendant  must  be  considered  unavailable whenever his
  location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained  by  due
  diligence; or
    (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
  to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
  on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
  another  matter,  the  period  extending from the day the court issues a
  bench warrant pursuant to section  530.70  because  of  the  defendant's
  failure  to  appear  in  court  when  required, to the day the defendant
  subsequently appears in  the  court  pursuant  to  a  bench  warrant  or
  voluntarily or otherwise; or
    (d)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay when the defendant is joined for
  trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
  section has not  run  and  good  cause  is  not  shown  for  granting  a
  severance; or
    (e)  the  period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
  another jurisdiction provided the district attorney  is  aware  of  such
  detention  and  has  been  diligent  and  has made reasonable efforts to
  obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
    (f) the period during which the defendant is without  counsel  through
  no  fault  of  the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
  own attorney with the permission of the court; or
    (g) other periods of delay occasioned  by  exceptional  circumstances,
  including  but  not  limited  to,  the  period of delay resulting from a
  continuance granted at the request of a district  attorney  if  (i)  the
  continuance  is  granted  because  of  the  unavailability  of  evidence
  material to the people's case, when the district attorney has  exercised
  due  diligence  to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds
  to believe that such evidence will  become  available  in  a  reasonable
  period;  or  (ii)  the  continuance  is  granted  to  allow the district
  attorney additional time to prepare the  people's  case  and  additional
  time is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case.
    (h)   the  period  during  which  an  action  has  been  adjourned  in
  contemplation of dismissal  pursuant  to  sections  170.55,  170.56  and
  215.10 of this chapter.
    (i)  The  period  prior  to  the  defendant's  actual  appearance  for
  arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been  directed  to
  appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
  120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10.
    (j)  the period during which a family offense is before a family court
  until such time as an  accusatory  instrument  or  indictment  is  filed
  against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
  such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
    5.  For  purposes  of  this  section, (a) where the defendant is to be
  tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
  following a mistrial,  an  order  for  a  new  trial  or  an  appeal  or
  collateral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to the custody
  of the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
  withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
  retrial becomes final;
    (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
  criminal  action  must  be  deemed  to  have  commenced  on the date the
  defendant first appears in a local criminal court  in  response  to  the
  ticket;
    (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
  complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
  either  the  felony  complaint  is  replaced  with  or  converted  to an
  information, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint  pursuant
  to  article  180  or  a  prosecutor's  information  is filed pursuant to
  section 190.70, the period applicable for the  purposes  of  subdivision
  one  must  be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
  instrument,  calculated  from  the  date  of  the  filing  of  such  new
  accusatory  instrument;  provided,  however,  that when the aggregate of
  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
  subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
  felony complaint to the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  new  accusatory
  instrument  exceeds  six months, the period applicable to the charges in
  the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
  accusatory instrument had not been filed;
    (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
  complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
  either  the  felony  complaint  is  replaced  with  or  converted  to an
  information, prosecutor's information or misdemeanor complaint  pursuant
  to  article  180  or  a  prosecutor's  information  is filed pursuant to
  section 190.70, the period applicable for the  purposes  of  subdivision
  two  must  be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
  instrument,  calculated  from  the  date  of  the  filing  of  such  new
  accusatory  instrument;  provided,  however,  that when the aggregate of
  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
  subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
  felony complaint to the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  new  accusatory
  instrument  exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
  the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
  accusatory instrument had not been filed.
    (e)  where  a  count  of  an  indictment  is  reduced to charge only a
  misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a  prosecutor's
  information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
  210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
  this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
  accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
  subdivision  four  of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
  filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
  instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
  the  indictment  must  remain  applicable  and  continue  as  if the new
  accusatory instrument had not been filed;
    (f) where a count of  an  indictment  is  reduced  to  charge  only  a
  misdemeanor  or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
  information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
  210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
  this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
  accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
  subdivision  four  of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
  filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
  instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
  the  indictment  must  remain  applicable  and  continue  as  if the new
  accusatory instrument had not been filed.
    6. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one  through  seven
  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indictment are
  also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.

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