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ARTICLE 30--TIMELINESS OF PROSECUTIONS
AND SPEEDY TRIAL
Section 30.10 Timeliness of prosecutions; periods of limitation.
30.20 Speedy trial; in general.
30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
S 30.10 Timeliness of prosecutions; periods of limitation.
1. A criminal action must be commenced within the period of limitation
prescribed in the ensuing subdivisions of this section.
2. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three:
(a) A prosecution for a class A felony may be commenced at any time;
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within five
years after the commission thereof;
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within two years
after the commission thereof;
(d) A prosecution for a petty offense must be commenced within one
year after the commission thereof.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, the periods of
limitation for the commencement of criminal actions are extended as
follows in the indicated circumstances:
(a) A prosecution for larceny committed by a person in violation of a
fiduciary duty may be commenced within one year after the facts
constituting such offense are discovered or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have been discovered by the aggrieved party
or by a person under a legal duty to represent him who is not himself
implicated in the commission of the offense.
(b) A prosecution for any offense involving misconduct in public
office by a public servant may be commenced at any time during the
defendant`s service in such office or within five years after the
termination of such service; provided however, that in no event shall
the period of limitation be extended by more than five years beyond the
period otherwise applicable under subdivision two.
(c) A prosecution for any crime set forth in title twenty-seven or
article seventy-one of the environmental conservation law may be
commenced within four years after the facts constituting such crime are
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been
discovered by a public servant who has the responsibility to enforce the
provisions of said title and article.
(d) A prosecution for any misdemeanor set forth in the tax law or
chapter forty-six of the administrative code of the city of New York
must be commenced within three years after the commission thereof.
(e) A prosecution for course of sexual conduct in the first degree as
defined in section 130.75 of the penal law and course of sexual conduct
in the second degree as defined in section 130.80 of the penal law may
be commenced within five years of the commission of the most recent act
of sexual conduct.
(f) For purposes of a prosecution involving a sexual offense as
defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against
a child less than eighteen years of age, incest as defined in section
255.25 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen
years of age, or use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in
section 263.05 of the penal law, the period of limitation shall not
begin to run until the child has reached the age of eighteen or the
offense is reported to a law enforcement agency or statewide central
register of child abuse and maltreatment, whichever occurs earlier.
4. In calculating the time limitation applicable to commencement of a
criminal action, the following periods shall not be included:
(a) Any period following the commission of the offense during which
(i) the defendant was continuously outside this state or (ii) the
whereabouts of the defendant were continuously unknown and continuously
unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence. However, in no
event shall the period of limitation be extended by more than five years
beyond the period otherwise applicable under subdivision two.
(b) When a prosecution for an offense is lawfully commenced within the
prescribed period of limitation therefor, and when an accusatory
instrument upon which such prosecution is based is subsequently
dismissed by an authorized court under directions or circumstances
permitting the lodging of another charge for the same offense or an
offense based on the same conduct, the period extending from the
commencement of the thus defeated prosecution to the dismissal of the
accusatory instrument does not constitute a part of the period of
limitation applicable to commencement of prosecution by a new charge.
S 30.20 Speedy trial; in general.
1. After a criminal action is commenced, the defendant is entitled to
a speedy trial.
2. Insofar as is practicable, the trial of a criminal action must be
given preference over civil cases; and the trial of a criminal action
where the defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff
during the pendency of the criminal action must be given preference over
other criminal actions.
S 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
the people are not ready for trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months and none of which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
three months and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months;
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he must be
released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may
be just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in that
criminal action within:
(a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
(b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of
which is a felony;
(c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the
custody of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor
punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months
and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
more than three months;
(d) five days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
which is a crime.
3. (a) Subdivisions one and two do not apply to a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined in sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25 and 125.27 of the penal law.
(b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of the
specified period and their present unreadiness is due to some
exceptional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to, the
sudden unavailability of evidence material to the people`s case, when
the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such
evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence
will become available in a reasonable period.
(c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
(i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
another offense;
(ii) require the release from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another criminal charge as to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
(iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from custody pursuant to this section or
otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial
proceeding at which his presence is required or otherwise.
4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for
trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following periods must
be excluded:
(a) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by the court;
or
(b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his
counsel. The court must grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into
account the public interest in the prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A defendant without counsel must not be deemed to have
consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent; or
(c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent
whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due
diligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his
location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence; or
(ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day the court issues a
bench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 because of the defendant`s
failure to appear in court when required, to the day the defendant
subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or
voluntarily or otherwise; or
(d) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section has not run and good cause is not shown for granting a
severance; or
(e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
another jurisdiction provided the district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent and has made reasonable efforts to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
(f) the period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
(g) other periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence
material to the people`s case, when the district attorney has exercised
due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds
to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable
period; or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district
attorney additional time to prepare the people`s case and additional
time is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case.
(h) the period during which an action has been adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and
215.10 of this chapter.
(i) The period prior to the defendant`s actual appearance for
arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10.
(j) the period during which a family offense is before a family court
until such time as an accusatory instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
5. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or
collateral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to the custody
of the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
retrial becomes final;
(b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the
ticket;
(c) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor`s information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article 180 or a prosecutor`s information is filed pursuant to
section 190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision
one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new
accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in
the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(d) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor`s information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article 180 or a prosecutor`s information is filed pursuant to
section 190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision
two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new
accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
(e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor`s
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one of
this section must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor`s
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision two of
this section must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
6. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through seven
of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indictment are
also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
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