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ARTICLE 125
HOMICIDE, ABORTION AND RELATED OFFENSES
Section 125.00 Homicide defined.
125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
125.10 Criminally negligent homicide.
125.11 Aggravated criminally negligent homicide.
125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree.
125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.
125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree.
125.21 Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree.
125.22 Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree.
125.25 Murder in the second degree.
125.26 Aggravated murder.
125.27 Murder in the first degree.
125.40 Abortion in the second degree.
125.45 Abortion in the first degree.
125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree.
125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree.
125.60 Issuing abortional articles.
S 125.00 Homicide defined.
Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four
weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first
degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent
homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first
degree.
S 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms.
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Person," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
2. "Abortional act" means an act committed upon or with respect to a
female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she
is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the
administering, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner,
with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.
3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when
committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician
acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve
her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her
pregnancy. A pregnant female`s commission of an abortional act upon
herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed
physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2)
within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The
submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she
believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting
under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her
life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her
pregnancy.
S 125.10 Criminally negligent homicide.
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with
criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.
Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.
S 125.11 Aggravated criminally negligent homicide.
A person is guilty of aggravated criminally negligent homicide when,
with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of a police officer
or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing his
or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
Aggravated criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony.
S 125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when
he:
(1) commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide as defined in
section 125.10, and either
(2) causes the death of such other person by operation of a vehicle in
violation of subdivision two, three or four of section eleven hundred
ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law or by operation of a vessel or
public vessel in violation of paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) of
subdivision two of section forty-nine-a of the navigation law, or
(3) causes the death of such other person by operation of a motor
vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than eighteen
thousand pounds which contains flammable gas, radioactive materials or
explosives in violation of subdivision one of section eleven hundred
ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and such flammable gas,
radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, by
operation of a snowmobile in violation of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of
subdivision one of section 25.24 of the parks, recreation and historic
preservation law or by operation of an all terrain vehicle as defined in
paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section twenty-two hundred
eighty-one of the vehicle and traffic law in violation of subdivision
two, three, or four of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle
and traffic law.
Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.
S 125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when
he:
(1) commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree
as defined in section 125.12, and
(2) commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that:
(a) his license or his privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another
state or his privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle
in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or
revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense
which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any
of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle
and traffic law; or (b) his license or his privilege of operating a
motor vehicle in the state or his privilege of obtaining a license
issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and
such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit
to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the
vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any
of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle
and traffic law.
Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree is a class C felony.
S 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
1. He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
2. He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death,
unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three
of section 125.05; or
3. He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.
Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
S 125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree.
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do
not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of
section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance
reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be
proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or
3. He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks
an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is
justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or
4. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical
injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury
to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.
Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 125.21 Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree.
A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree
when he or she recklessly causes the death of a police officer or peace
officer where such officer was in the course of performing his or her
official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
S 125.22 Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree.
A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree
when:
1. with intent to cause serious physical injury to a police officer or
peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or
her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that such victim was a police officer or a peace officer, he or
she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or peace
officer; or
2. with intent to cause the death of a police officer or peace
officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her
official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that such victim was a police officer or peace officer, he or she causes
the death of such officer or another police officer or peace officer
under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he or she
acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in
paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that
homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to
aggravated manslaughter in the first degree or manslaughter in the first
degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this
subdivision.
Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
S 125.25 Murder in the second degree.
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; except that in any
prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant`s situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or
(b) The defendant`s conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime; or
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or
3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits
or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the
first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first
degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape
in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such
crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if
there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in
which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying
crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury
and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding
persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
physical injury; or
4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,
and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death
to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the
death of such person.
Murder in the second degree is a class A-I felony.
S 125.26 Aggravated murder.
A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes
the death of such person, or of a third person who was a person
described in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of this
subdivision engaged at the time of the killing in the course of
performing his or her official duties; and
(a) Either:
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the
time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the victim was such a uniformed
court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the
division for youth; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
2. In any prosecution under subdivision one of this section, it is an
affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the first
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in
the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime
except murder in the second degree.
Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.
S 125.27 Murder in the first degree.
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; and
(a) Either:
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of
the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended
victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or
reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a
uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee
of the division for youth; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence
commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate
term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of
which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing,
the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving
such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or
custody; or
(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior
occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the
intended victim`s testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended
victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and
the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for
such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family
member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the
killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate
family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal
action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of
exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As
used in this subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband,
wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent,
grandparent, stepchild or grandchild; or
(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended
victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of
a party to such agreement; or
(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,
burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first
degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree,
aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in the first
degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after
committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the course of
and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit the crime
of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim is not a
participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided further
that, unless the defendant`s criminal liability under this subparagraph
is based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the
death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 20.00 of this
chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the defendant`s
criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another pursuant to
section 20.00 of this chapter; or
(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal
transaction; or
(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,
or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if
committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such
sections; or
(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim`s death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing
debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of
pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more
additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions
within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar
fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision
twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the
defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the
killing, a judge; or
(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this
chapter; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant`s situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree; or
(b) The defendant`s conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.
Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
S 125.40 Abortion in the second degree.
A person is guilty of abortion in the second degree when he commits an
abortional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable
pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Abortion in the second degree is a class E felony.
S 125.45 Abortion in the first degree.
A person is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits
upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act
which causes the miscarriage of such female, unless such abortional act
is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Abortion in the first degree is a class D felony.
S 125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree.
A female is guilty of self-abortion in the second degree when, being
pregnant, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself,
unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three
of section 125.05.
Self-abortion in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
S 125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree.
A female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being
pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an
abortional act upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such
abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section
125.05.
Self-abortion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
S 125.60 Issuing abortional articles.
A person is guilty of issuing abortional articles when he
manufactures, sells or delivers any instrument, article, medicine, drug
or substance with intent that the same be used in unlawfully procuring
the miscarriage of a female.
Issuing abortional articles is a class B misdemeanor.
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